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Chapter 15
Singapore’s Social Security Savings System:
A Review and Some Lessons for the
United States
Benedict S. K. Koh
Singapore is one of the world’s fastest aging nations, due primarily to its low
fertility rates and long life expectancy.1 In the next two decades, it may
overtake every country except Japan in its elderly fraction of the population.
This demographic trend places a heavy burden on its pension system to be
the main vehicle to prepare citizens for old age.
Singapore’s social security savings system was set up with the primary goal
of helping citizens prepare for retirement. Unlike the deﬁned beneﬁt
Social Security system adopted by the United States and European nations,
Singapore operates a deﬁned contribution (DC) savings system adminis-
tered by a government statutory board, the Central Provident Fund (CPF).
The CPF was established even before Singapore became independent from
the British colonial rule. Under this system, members have their own
individual retirement accounts and assume sole responsibility for providing
for their own retirement needs. When originally conceived, CPF’s main
focus was retirement adequacy. However, over the years, it has evolved into
a system with multi-faceted objectives.
The CPF Board states that it aims to achieve ﬁve objectives, helping its
members accumulate sufﬁcient savings to (1) ﬁnance retirement, (2) own a
home, (3) pay for health care, (4) provide insurance protection for family,
and (5) enhance assets for future consumption. The CPF calibrates its
policies to only provide for basic needs. This means that individuals who
wish to have a lavish retirement must rely on private savings to fund needs
beyond the basic level. The income groups targeted by policymakers are the
10th to 80th percentile of the working population, with the lowest income
group receiving ﬁnancial assistance from the government.
This chapter reviews the key features of Singapore’s social security savings
system and evaluates whether the ﬁve key objectives set by the CPF have been
successfully achieved. We show that Singapore’s system is generally successful
in meeting the needs of citizens for home ownership, health care, and
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protection but it requires reforms to secure retirement adequacy and asset
enhancement for its members. We go on to make speciﬁc suggestions for the
types of reforms that might be undertaken to improve retirement security.
In what follows, we ﬁrst outline the structure of Singapore’s social security
savings system, focusing on the links between the Central Provident Fund’s
schemes and its ﬁve key objectives. Next, we show how the CPF system has
been liberalized to cater to the changing needs of its members. Subse-
quently, we identify gaps in the current system and suggest reforms that
can be made to improve it. We conclude by identifying some lessons Singa-
pore’s pension system can provide for the United States.
The Central Provident Fund (CPF)
The Central Provident Fund was ﬁrst established in 1955 as a mandatory
retirement savings scheme. As of the end of 2013, the scheme covered 3.51
million members, of whom 1.85 million were active (Table 15.1).2 The CPF’s
deﬁned contribution plan is funded by mandatory contributions from
members’ monthly wages. Table 15.2 shows the contribution rates made by
employees (age 35 and below) and employers to the CPF Board. At incep-
tion of the scheme, the contribution rate was 10 percent; it subsequently
rose to a peak of 50 percent in 1984–5. The contribution rate ﬂuctuated
between 35 and 40 percent during the thirteen-year period between 1986
and 1998, before declining to a low of 30 percent in 1999. It held steady at 36
percent over the period 2011 to 2014.
The CPF Board initially channeled all contributions into a single account,
but over the years this has expanded to four accounts: the Ordinary Account
(OA), the Special Account (SA), the Medisave Account (MA), and the
Retirement Account (RA) (Figure 15.1). Cash savings in these accounts
earn interest on their balances. The savings in the Ordinary Account (OA)
can be withdrawn to purchase homes, service mortgage payments, ﬁnance
premiums for insurance protection, pay for children’s tertiary education,
and to invest in ﬁnancial products to grow savings. The Special Account,
introduced in 1977, holds savings primarily for retirement, which cannot be
withdrawn before the age of 55. Members can deposit them with the CPF
Board to earn interest, or they can invest in a smaller set of lower risk
ﬁnancial products. The Medisave account, created in 1984, holds savings
for members to pay inpatient hospital bills, selected outpatient treatments,
and premiums for insurance against catastrophic illness and disabilities. All
working adults have only three accounts until they turn 55 years old, when
savings earmarked for retirement are deposited into the Retirement
Account (RA). Since 2013, it is mandatory for all CPF members to invest
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their RA savings in life annuities (CPF life) to provide a stream of income
from age 65 until their deaths.
The CPF contribution rates and allocation into the three accounts are not
uniform but decline with age as shown in Table 15.3. In 2014, those age 35
and below had to contribute 20 percent of their monthly wages, and their
employers 16 percent, to the CPF Board. Of the total 36 percent contribu-
tion, 23 percent is deposited into the Ordinary Account, 6 percent into the
Special Account, and 7 percent into the Medisave Account. At the other end
of age band, contributions from elderly workers over 65 and their employers
decline sharply to 5 percent and 6.5 percent respectively; the allocations
into Ordinary, Special, and Medisave accounts are 1, 1, and 9.5 percent
respectively. These contribution rates apply to wages up to an income
ceiling of S$5,000 per month.3 For workers earning more than S$5,000
per month, both the employer and employee contributions are computed
based on the income ceiling.4
Members’ contributions into their CPF accounts over time have resulted
in substantial asset accumulation. Aggregate contributions to the OA, SA,
table 15.1 Contributions and balances in Singapore’s Central Provident Fund
(CPF) system
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total Number of
CPF Members (mil)
3.23 3.29 3.34 3.38 3.42 3.51
Total Number of
Active CPF
Members (mil)
1.61 1.64 1.7 1.74 1.79 1.85
Total Contributions
(S$m)
20,294 20,125 21,993 24,628 26,048 28,530
Ordinary Account
(OA) Balance
(S$m)
65,341.10 70,593.80 77,939.50 85,084.80 91,862.00 98,336.20
Special Account
(SA) Balance (S$m)
30,547.30 35,389.20 40,392.70 46,533.70 53,191.90 60,142.60
Medisave Account
(MA) Balance
(S$m)
42,928.20 46,238.00 50,671.20 55,329.30 60,024.40 65,576.00
Retirement
Account Balance
and Others (RA)
(S$m)
12,490.50 14,583.00 16,884.60 20,597.70 25,079.30 28,913.80
Total Members’
Balance (S$m)
151,307.10 166,804.00 185,880.00 207,545.50 230,157.70 252,968.60
Source : Singapore’s CPF (2014).
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and Medisave accounts in 2013 totaled S$28.5 billion, and CPF balances
stood at S$253 billion (Table 15.1). Retirement savings of members have
grown 67 percent over the last ﬁve years.
Currently, CPF savings in the Ordinary Account (OA) and Special
Account (SA) are paid a government-set interest rate of 2.5 percent and 4
percent per annum respectively. This interest rate is not ﬁxed but can
ﬂuctuate over the years, as shown in Table 15.4. The highest interest rate
CPF Member’s Individual 
Account
Ordinary Account (OA)
CPF Investment 
Scheme OA
Other Schemes:
* Education
* Home Ownership
* Family Protection
Special Account (SA)
CPF Investment 
Scheme SA
Other Scheme:
Retirement
Medisave Account 
(MA)
Hospitalization
expenses
MediShield scheme
Retirement Account 
(RA)
Employee Contributions
Employer Contributions
Figure 15.1 Central Provident Fund (CPF): overview
Source : Singapore’s CPF (2014).
table 15.3 2014 contribution rates for various age groups (% of monthly wage)
Contribution Rate (for monthly wages 
$750)
Credited to
Employee
Age (Years)
Contribution
by Employer
Contribution
by Employee
Total
Contribution
Ordinary
Account
Special
Account
Medisave
Account
35 & below 16 20 36 23 6 7
Above 35–45 16 20 36 21 7 8
Above 45–50 16 20 36 19 8 9
Above 50–55 14 18.5 32.5 13.5 9.5 9.5
Above 55–60 10.5 13 23.5 12 2 9.5
Above 60–65 7 7.5 14.5 3.5 1.5 9.5
Above 65 6.5 5 11.5 1 1 9.5
Source : Singapore’s CPF (2014).
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table 15.4 Singapore CPF interest rates paid over time
A. Interest Rate Paid on All CPF Accounts: 1955–1995
Year CPF Interest Rate Per Annum (%)
1955–1962 2.5
1963 5
1964–1966 5.25
1967–1969 5.5
1970–1973 5.75
1974–Feb. 1986 6.5
Mar.–June 1986 5.78
July–Dec. 1986 5.38
Jan.–June 1987 4.34
July 1987–Dec. 1987 3.31
Jan.–June 1988 3.19
July–Dec. 1988 2.96
Jan.–June 1989 3.1
July–Dec. 1989 3.39
Jan.–June 1990 3.77
July–Dec. 1990 3.88
Jan.–June 1991 4.85
July–Dec. 1991 4.54
Jan.–June 1992 4.59
July–Dec. 1992 3.31
Jan.–June 1993 2.62
July 1993–Dec. 1994 2.5
Jan.–June 1995 3.1
B. Higher Interest Rates Were Paid from Mid-1995 on Special, Retirement, and Medisave
Accounts
Year Interest Rate Per Annum (%)
From 1 July 1995
Ordinary and Special and
Medisave Accounts Retirement Accounts
July–Dec. 1995 3.82 5.07
Jan.–June 1996 3.52 4.77
July 1996–June 1998 3.48 4.73
July–Dec. 1998 4.29 5.79
Jan.–June 1999 4.41 5.91
July 1999–Sept. 2001 2.5 4
From 1 October 2001
Ordinary Medisave, Special and
Account Retirement Accounts
Oct. 2001–Dec. 2006 2.5 4
Notes :
a) The Special Account, Medisave Account, and Retirement Account were introduced in July
1977, Apr. 1984, and Jan. 1987 respectively.
b) From 1955 to 1976, CPF interests were credited and compounded annually.
c) From 1977 to 1985, CPF interests were credited quarterly and compounded annually.
d) From 1986 to present, CPF interests are computed monthly and compounded and credited
annually.
e) From 1 July 1999, CPF interests are reviewed quarterly.
Source : Singapore’s CPF (2014).
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paid was 6.5 percent during the thirteen-year period from 1974 to 1986.
Since then, the OA rate has declined gradually to 2.5 percent, in line with
the global interest cycle. The actual return paid on Ordinary Account
balances is computed as the maximum of 2.5 percent or the average deposit
rate paid on the twelve-month ﬁxed deposit and savings deposits by major
local banks.5 This means that the CPF Board guarantees a minimum nom-
inal return of 2.5 percent per annum (stipulated by the CPF Act) and it
provides members the opportunity to earn a higher return should bank
deposit rates rise. The interest rate paid on balances in Special, Medisave,
and Retirement Accounts is computed as the twelve-month average yield of
ten-year Singapore Government Securities plus 1 percent. However, the rate
has a ﬂoor of 4 percent, set at 1.5 percent above the OA rate. There has been
no change in the OA rate of 2.5 percent and SA rate of 4 percent since 1999.
To help members grow their savings further, the CPF Board announced that
it would pay an extra 1 percent on the ﬁrst S$60,000 of combined savings,
including up to S$20,000 in the Ordinary Account. As of the end of 2013,
CPF members have S$253 billion in savings, of which 39 percent is allocated
in the Ordinary Account, 24 percent in the Special Account, 26 percent in
the Medisave Account, and 11 percent in the Retirement Account.
Review of Singapore’s Social Security
Savings System
Currently, the CPF operates a comprehensive social security savings system
providing funding for retirement, health care, home ownership, family
protection, and asset enhancement. These objectives were achieved
through various schemes introduced from 1968 to 2009, as shown in
Table 15.5. On the program’s inception, all CPF savings were defaulted
into a single account earning a prescribed interest rate for retirement.
Over time, the CPF system has liberalized to permit savings to be used for
other purposes. The Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) was introduced in
1968 to permit members to use CPF savings to purchase public housing
apartments.6 Ten years later, in 1978, CPF liberalized further to allow mem-
bers to purchase common shares in a listed company (Singapore Bus Ser-
vice). In 1981 and 1986, CPF savings were permitted to be used for
the purchase of private properties and commercial properties respectively.
The Approved Investment Scheme (IS) was introduced in 1986 to allow
members to use a restricted portion of their savings for investment in
speciﬁed ﬁnancial instruments. The scheme was further liberalized to allow
members to invest 100 percent of OA and SA savings in 2001.7 Over the
decades, the CPF Board has introduced many new schemes such as Home
Protection, Medisave Account, Minimum Sum, Dependent’s Protection,
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Education Financing, MediShield, Medifund, Eldershield, and the CPF life
annuities to enhance the social security savings system.
In the following sections, we review the key measures taken by the CPF to
achieve its goals of retirement adequacy, home ownership, health care
adequacy, ﬁnancial protection, and asset enhancement.
Home ownership
Singapore citizens are encouraged to own their homes, to ensure that they
not only have roofs over their heads but are also rooted in their country. The
CPF has introduced two schemes, the Public Housing Scheme and the
Residential Properties Scheme, to promote home ownership.
The Public Housing Scheme was introduced in 1968 to help members
purchase public housing apartments known as HDB ﬂats. These ﬂats ranged
in size from 807 square feet (three-room) to 1,453 square feet (ﬁve-room).
The amount of withdrawals allowed from members’ OA account is the
minimum of either the purchase price or the market value of the ﬂat. In
addition, OA savings can be used to service the mortgage payments for the
duration of the loan, which can be as long as 30 years.
The Residential Properties Scheme was introduced in 1981 to help CPF
members purchase homes sold by private developers. These homes cost
substantially more than public housing apartments. Under the scheme, CPF
table 15.5 Singapore CPF schemes
Goal Scheme Year introduced
1) Home Ownership Public Housing Scheme 1968
Residential Properties Scheme 1981
2) Protection for family Home Protection Scheme 1981
Dependent’s Protection Scheme 1989
3) Healthcare Financing Medisave Account 1984
MediShield Scheme 1990
Medifund 1993
Eldershield 2002
4) Retirement Adequacy Minimum Sum Scheme 1987
CPF Top-up Scheme 1995
CPF Life Annuity 2009
5) Asset Enhancement CPF Investment Scheme 1986
Non-residential Properties Scheme 1986
6) Others Tertiary Education ﬁnancing for children 1989
Note : When introduced in 1986, the CPF Investment Scheme was known as Approved Invest-
ment Scheme (IS).
Source : Singapore’s CPF (2014).
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members can withdrawmore than 160 percent of the value of the purchased
property from their Ordinary Account to pay for the purchase price as well
as service mortgage payments. In recent years, the CPF has taken steps to
reduce the excessive withdrawal of CPF savings for housing, with the aim of
reducing the limit gradually to 120 percent of the home’s valuation.
Figure 15.2A shows a time series of home ownership rates in Singapore,
which grew from 58.8 percent in 1980 to 90.5 percent in 2013. A comparison
of the home ownership statistics across countries in Figure 15.2B indicates
that Singapore has one of the highest home ownership rates in the world.
Home ownership is much higher in Singapore (90.5 percent) compared to
those in developed countries such as the United States (66 percent) and
United Kingdom (64 percent). This shows that the two housing schemes
have been successful in promoting home ownership in Singapore.
Pursuing high home ownership does come at a cost of diminished retire-
ment adequacy. Figure 15.3 shows that 44 percent of cumulative CPF con-
tributions have been invested in housing, leaving the remaining for
retirement and other purposes. The decline in retirement adequacy is
somewhat mitigated by the appreciation of home values over the last four
decades. Figure 15.4A shows that private properties have appreciated 16
times since 1975 or 7.77 percent per annum for the last 38 years.
Figure 15.4B shows that public housing apartments also registered ﬁve
times appreciation since 1990, or 8.2 percent per annum over the last 23
years. The sharp appreciation in the home values allows CPF members the
option of cashing out of their properties or entering in a reverse mortgage
contract to generate income to ﬁnance retirement.
Financial protection for families
A key ﬁnancial risk faced by families is the loss of income due to death or
permanent disability of the breadwinner. To hedge this risk, the CPF Board
has introduced two insurance schemes (dependent’s protection scheme
and home protection scheme) to cover members and their dependents
against death and permanent disability.8 The Dependents’ Protection
Scheme provides term insurance protection of S$46,000 up to age 60 at
an affordable premium. The policy provides ﬁnancial assistance to families
in the ﬁrst few years of the insured’s incapacity or death. CPF members who
wish to have insurance coverage of more than S$46,000 can utilize their OA
savings to purchase private insurance. Table 15.6 shows that more than half
(between 55 and 57 percent) of CPF members purchase term insurance
plans to protect their families.
The Home Protection Scheme is a mortgage-reducing insurance scheme
to prevent members from losing their homes in the event of death or
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Panel A. Percentage of home ownership in Singapore over time.
Panel B. Percentage of home ownership across countries.
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Figure 15.2 Comparative home ownership statistics
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Statistics (2013).
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permanent disability. This scheme is mandatory for members who use CPF
savings to purchase public housing. When death or permanent disability
occurs, the CPF Board will pay off the insured’s outstanding housing loan.
The scheme covers members until age 65 or for the full duration of the
housing loan.
Health care ﬁnancing
As citizens age, their health care expenditures are expected to rise signiﬁ-
cantly. Such increases result from escalation in health care costs, increasing
usage of sophisticated medical technology for treatment, and longer life
expectancy of individuals. The CPF supports health care ﬁnancing for its
members through the 3-M framework: Medisave, MediShield, and Medi-
Fund. The Medisave Scheme was set up in 1984 to help members save for
future medical expenditures. Initially, these savings could only be used to
Retirement & Others 
Balance
2.39%
OA Balance
21.90%
SA Balance
7.50%
Medisave Balance
13.00%
Education 
withdrawal
0.19%
CPFIS-OA
8.57%CPFIS-SA
1.87%
Special discounted 
shares
0.72%
Property withdrawal
43.88%
Figure 15.3 Cumulative use of Central Provident Funds. (Ordinary Account and
Special Account combined)
Source: Koh et al. (2008a).
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pay inpatient hospitalization expenses incurred by members or their
dependents. Over time, the scheme was expanded to permit selected out-
patient treatments such as chemotherapy and radiotherapy, along with step-
down care in community hospitals and hospices. Savings in the Medisave
Account can also be used to pay premiums for medical insurance schemes
such as MediShield and ElderShield. Table 15.7 shows contribution rates as
a share of salary that go into the Medisave Account for the various age
Panel A. Singapore PrivateProperty Price Index Overtime
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groups. For a young person age 35 years and below, 7 percent of monthly
income is credited to his Medisave Account in 2014, while the contribution
rate is higher, at 9.5 percent, for those over age 50.
To ensure that there are sufﬁcient savings for health care, members are
encouraged to build up their Medisave Account balances to $43,500. Once
they attain that amount, excess savings will be transferred to their Special
Accounts (below age 55) or Retirement Accounts (above age 55). In add-
ition, members must set aside the Medisave Required Amount of $40,500 in
the Medisave Account at age 55 to ensure there are sufﬁcient savings to
ﬁnance future medical expenditures during retirement.
To help members hit those targets, the CPF Board has progressively
increased contributions to Medisave Accounts from 6 percent in 1984 to a
range of 7–9.5 percent in 2014 for the various age groups (Table 15.7).
Furthermore, since 1992, contribution rates for older age groups have
increased more rapidly than those in the younger age groups.
While CPF members can rely on their Medisave savings to pay small
hospital bills and outpatient treatments, they do risk depleting these savings
if they are struck with prolonged or catastrophic illnesses. To help members
pay these large hospital bills, the MediShield Scheme was introduced in
1990 to provide insurance coverage for costly health care expenditures.
Medishield uses risk pooling to keep the cost of insurance low and provide
wider coverage for participants. The scheme covers members up to 92 years
of age. Those who wish to have insurance coverage for treatment in private
hospitals or better class wards in public hospitals can purchase upgraded
insurance plans (Integrated Shield Plan) from private insurers. The Medi-
shield is an opt-in plan with a high participation rate of 93 percent in 2012
(see Table 15.6).
The health care needs of average CPF members are adequately covered
by the Medisave and MediShield schemes. Nevertheless, a minority of
people are too poor to enroll in the MediShield plan or contribute to
table 15.7 Contributions to MediSave Account by age groups (% of monthly wage)
Age
Year < 35 35–44 45–9 50–4 55–9 60–4 > 65
1984 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
1990 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
1995 6 7 8 8 8 8 8
2000 6 7 8 8 8 8 7.5
2005 6 7 8 8 8 8.5 8.5
2010 7 8 9 9 9 9.5 9.5
2014 7 8 9 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5
Source : Singapore’s CPF (2014).
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their Medisave Accounts. The government has speciﬁcally created the Med-
ifund to help this group with their health care bills. Applicants are means-
tested to ensure that only the ﬁnancially needy can tap into this fund. The
government’s strong support for Medifund assures citizens that they will
always have access to basic medical care.
Elderly CPF members are also strongly encouraged by the government to
participate in ElderShield, a disability insurance scheme that provides cover-
age for long-term care. This insurance scheme pays a cash payout of S$400
per month for 72 months if the insured is struck with disabilities. CPF
members who reach 40 years old are automatically enrolled in the insurance
plan and pay premiums until they are 65 years old. The premium is ﬁxed at
the age of entry and will not increase with age. Although premium payment
ends at age 65, the insurance coverage is for life.
Retirement adequacy
Singapore is experiencing seismic changes in the demographics of its popu-
lation. By 2030, approximately 900,000 workers (a quarter of citizens) will
leave the workforce and go into retirement. Furthermore, these cohorts are
also expected to live longer. Singapore’s life expectancy was estimated to be
82 in 2010, one of the highest in the world. While the early pioneers who
settled in Singapore had large families with many children to depend on for
ﬁnancial support during old age, more recent retirees will not be in this
position. This is because they have smaller families, a trend that is prevalent
in developing countries experiencing rising afﬂuence. It is therefore crucial
that Singapore’s social security savings system adequately prepare workers
for old age. To this end, the CPF Board set up the Special Account Scheme
in 1977 to help members accumulate savings for retirement. Every working
adult is required to make contributions based on a percentage of his
monthly wage to his Special Account. The SA savings are strictly designated
for retirement and cannot be withdrawn until age 55.
In 1987, the CPF Board also established the Minimum Sum Scheme
requiring members to retain a minimum level of savings for old age. From
July 2013 onwards, members must set aside S$148,000 in their Retirement
Account upon reaching age 55, an amount deemed sufﬁcient to support a
subsistent level of living. The Minimum Sum was initially set at S$90,000 in
2005 but it has risen steadily to S$148,000 as of 2013 (Table 15.8). Such
upward adjustments in the Minimum Sum were necessary to keep up with
inﬂation, so that a consistent standard of living can be maintained through-
out retirement.
To boost cash savings, the CPF Board has both raised SA contribution
rates and paid higher interest on SA savings. The SA contribution at
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inception was 1 percent and it rose to a high of 6 percent in 2011 for those
ages 35 and below. A government review committee had recommended that
the total contribution rate be raised from the current level of 36 percent (for
those below 35 years old) to 40 percent in the future, and most of the
increase is to go into the Special Account for retirement purposes. Besides
the general uptrend in SA rate, the share of total contribution into the
Special Account will also increase as members age.
From 1977 to 1994, the interest rate paid on SA balances was identical to
that of OA balances. Since 1999, an additional 1.5 percent was paid on SA
balances above the OA rate. From 2008, the CPF Board has decided to pay
an extra 1 percent interest on the ﬁrst S$60,000 of combined CPF balances
with up to S$20,000 from the Ordinary Account to boost retirement savings.
This means that the ﬁrst S$20,000 in the Ordinary Account will earn 3.5
percent instead of the default 2.5 percent rate. The interest income earned
in the Ordinary Account annually will be transferred to the Special Account.
The remaining portion of S$40,000 from the Special Account or Retirement
account will be paid an interest rate of 5 percent instead of the default 4
percent rate. The CPF Board estimated that with the extra 1 percent interest
rate payment, members will earn an extra $1 billion in interest income in
their retirement accounts in 2011.
Figure 15.5 shows that during the thirty-four-year period from 1980 to
2014, interest rates on SA balances were generally higher than the inﬂation
rate.9 This means that retirement savings were growing at positive real rates
of return.
An indicator of retirement adequacy is the percentage of CPF members
that meet the Minimum Sum requirement at age 55. Another indicator is
the income replacement rate (IRR) of retirees, or the ratio of retirement
income to pre-retirement earnings. McGill et al. (2005) and Scheiber
(2004) suggested that IRR should be at least 70 percent.10 An early estimate
of Singapore’s IRR by McCarthy et al. (2002) found that it was a low 28
percent. Hui (2012) estimated the IRR for three groups segmented by
table 15.8 CPF Minimum Sum Scheme (MSS)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Required MSS
Amount (S$)
90,000 94,600 99,600 106,000 117,000 123,000 131,000 139,000 148,000
Persons
meeting MSS at
age 55 (%)
37.5 36.4 36.3 33.8 37.5 40.7 45.0 48.7
Note : S$1.25 is roughly equivalent to US$1.
Source : Singapore’s CPF (2014).
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education level (secondary, post-secondary, and tertiary) and found that
only the low-income secondary educated workers were able to achieve the
target IRR of 66 percent. A recent report by Mercer (2012) found that the
median income earner in Singapore achieved an IRR below 20 percent.
OECD (2009) estimated that Singapore’s IRR was a low 13 percent com-
pared to the 72 percent average for 34 member countries. Nevertheless,
critiques of Mercer’s and OECD’s IRR studies pointed to a lack of under-
standing of Singapore’s social security savings system. For example,
although both OA and SA savings can be used for retirement, these studies
only used SA savings to estimate Singapore’s IRR. Recently, Mercer (2013)
has rectiﬁed this error and raised Singapore’s IRR signiﬁcantly. OECD
(2009) estimated that if both OA and SA savings were used in the compu-
tation, Singapore’s IRR would have been 82 percent. The latest study by
Chia and Tsui (2012) found that a median male earner could achieve an
IRR of 70 percent if he retires at 65, while a female earner has a slightly
lower IRR of 64 percent. They concluded that a young Singaporean joining
the labor force would likely have sufﬁcient savings for retirement.
Although members do manage to save for retirement, many have insufﬁ-
cient cash savings to hit the Minimum Sum of S$148,000 (Table 15.9). Two
groups of members are especially vulnerable to ﬁnancial hardship during
retirement. The ﬁrst is the elderly who are above 60 and have average cash
savings of only S$52,000, an amount which would be sufﬁcient to only pay
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Figure 15.5 CPF interest rate and Singapore’s inﬂation rate over time
Note : OA refers to the Ordinary Account; SA refers to the Special Account.
Source : Singapore’s CPF (2014) and Singapore Department of Statistics (2013).
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for a few years of consumption. If they lack private savings or family support,
they will be in dire straits during the last stage of their lives. The second
vulnerable group is women above 55 who have substantially lower savings
than their male counterparts. As women tend to live longer than men, they
would need more ﬁnancial resources for retirement.
Given the high mandatory saving rates (36 percent of gross monthly salary
for those 35 years and below), it is puzzling why so many CPF members did
not accumulate even the Minimum Sum. Figure 15.3 provides a clue to this
liquidity problem. Almost half of members’ cumulative CPF contributions
(44 percent) have been withdrawn to purchase homes and to service mort-
gages, leaving only 29 percent of these contributions in Ordinary and
Special Accounts for retirement. These huge withdrawals meant that very
little cash savings remain in the CPF OA and SA accounts. The other reason
is that the contribution rate for the Special Account in past years may have
been too low. Only 6 percent of the total contribution of 36 percent (for
workers 35 and younger) went into the SA for retirement. The bulk of the
contributions of 23 percent went to the OA and was withdrawn prior to
retirement for other purposes.
In view of increasing life expectancy, retirees face the prospect of outliv-
ing their savings during old age. To hedge such longevity risk, the govern-
ment in 2009 introduced CPF Life, a life annuity for retirees. Initially
launched as a voluntary scheme, it is now mandatory for members to
purchase CPF Life using their Minimum Sums when they reach age 55.
This life annuity will pay a monthly income from the drawdown age of 65.
table 15.9 Singapore CPF member average balances by age and sex
Age group Men (S$) Women (S$)
< 20 852 1,196
20–5 6,386 12,003
25–30 33,242 40,893
30–5 59,886 61,365
35–40 85,353 85,587
40–5 105,009 93,789
45–50 100,360 88,570
50–5 109,538 92,260
55–60 100,905 81,077
60 + 51,642 33,759
Unspeciﬁed 1,888 2,205
All groups 72,421 62,264
Note : S$1.25 is roughly equivalent to US$1.
Source : Singapore’s CPF (2014).
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For members who do not have sufﬁcient savings to enroll in the annuity
scheme (less than S$40,000), they have the option to rejoin it if they
accumulate S$60,000 by the drawdown age of 65. The CPF Board currently
offers two plans for members: the Life Standard Plan and the Life Basic
Plan. The Life Standard plan offers members a higher monthly payout of S
$1,100–1,210 but a lower bequest (S$38,869 to S$177,061) to their beneﬁ-
ciaries.11 The Life Basic Plan offers a lower monthly payout of S$1,008–1,112
but a higher bequest (S$67,622 to S$212,925). By purchasing CPF Life,
members are assured of a subsistence level of income for the rest of their
lives.
Asset enhancement
The CPF Investment Scheme was introduced in 1986 to allow members to
invest their savings in a wide variety of ﬁnancial instruments to grow their
pension assets.12 CPF Members can avail themselves of many investment
products that could potentially earn a higher yield than the interest rate
paid by the CPF Board. Currently, the CPF operates the CPFIS-OA and
CPFIS-SA investment schemes which cover savings in the Ordinary Account
(OA) and Special Account (SA) respectively.
Under the CPFIS-OA scheme, members can invest their OA savings in
bank ﬁxed deposits, government bills and bonds, corporate bonds, property
funds, equities traded on the Singapore stock exchange, annuities and
endowment insurance policies, investment-linked insurance products, unit
trusts, exchange traded funds, fund management accounts, and gold. For
instruments deemed as more risky, the CPF Board place limits on the
maximum allowable investments. For example, a member can invest only
up to 10 percent of his OA savings in gold, and up to 35 percent in shares,
property funds/REITs, and corporate bonds. Such restriction ensures that
members’ portfolios are well diversiﬁed and take no concentrated risk in
any particular asset. For the CPFIS-SA scheme, a narrower set of ﬁnancial
products is permitted for investment, as members are discouraged from
taking high risk when investing savings meant for retirement. Members can
invest in all the ﬁnancial instruments in the CPFIS-OA scheme except fund
management accounts, shares, property funds, REITS, corporate bonds,
gold, investment-linked insurance products, unit trusts, and higher risk
exchange traded funds.
Low participation in CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS)
Prior research showed that only 12 percent of OA savings were utilized by
members for investment (Koh et al. 2008a) and the situation is similar for
the SA where members invested only 20 percent of their SA savings. In other
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words, the participation rate in CPF Investment Scheme has been low.
Possible reasons accounting for members’ preference to leave their savings
in the Special Account are the relatively high government-paid interest rate
of 4 percent per annum and the unwillingness of members to assume risk
for savings meant for retirement. Nevertheless, these reasons do not
adequately explain the reluctance of members to invest their OA savings,
since the interest rate paid is a meager 2.5 percent per annum.
Of the OA savings committed to investment, 63 percent went into insur-
ance products, 25 percent into shares, 11 percent into unit trusts, and a
negligible amount (0.64 percent) into other instruments such as bank
deposits, bonds, Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), gold, property funds,
and fund management accounts (Koh et al. 2008a). For the CPFIS-SA
scheme, 86 percent were invested in insurance products and 14 percent in
unit trusts. These ﬁndings suggest that, although the CPF Board offers a
comprehensive menu of investment options, members are not utilizing the
scheme fully. The asset allocation patterns of OA and SA savings showed that
members were prepared to take more risk with their OA funds than SA
funds. They seemed to put SA savings in a separate ‘mental account’
targeted for retirement and preferred not to take risk to actively manage
it. We observed two distinct investment behaviors of a high preference for
insurance products and a low preference for professionally managed funds.
The low yield on whole-life and endowment policies of 2–4 percent cannot
explain the preference for insurance products. A comparison of the relative
investment performance of investment-linked insurance products versus
unit trusts sheds light on the high investment in insurance products.
There is no empirical evidence to suggest that ILPs outperform unit trusts.
As the industry parlance goes, insurance policies are sold rather than
bought. With a large sales force and aggressive sales strategies, insurance
companies have been successful in persuading many CPF members to buy
insurance products. Other possible reasons for the low interest in profes-
sionally managed unit trusts include poor investment performance, high
fees and transaction costs charged by funds, and people’s lack of ﬁnancial
literacy to select funds. CPF members who lack ﬁnancial knowledge may not
know how to begin to assess the 400 funds on offer. Furthermore, selecting
the best fund to invest in means having to evaluate the return and risk
characteristics of 400 funds, a task too onerous even for many ﬁnancially
savvy members.
Performance of professionally managed funds
Koh et al. (2010) studied the performance of CPFIS unit trusts over two ten-
year periods, 1991–2001 and 1997–2007.13 These two periods were chosen
to coincide with the bear and bull phases of Singapore’s stock market.
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The question was whether CPF-included unit trusts were successful in help-
ing investors grow their retirement savings. The authors found that the
average return of CPFIS unit trusts ranged from 7.96 to 10.27 percent per
annum, higher than the risk-free and the CPF default interest rates (panel
A of Table 15.10). This means that CPF members were able to grow their
savings faster through investing in unit trusts than leaving them in CPF
default accounts.14
While unit trusts’ average returns were relatively high, the funds were
unable to outperform their style-speciﬁc benchmarks. A common statistic to
gauge the stock selection skill of fund managers is a positive Jensen alpha.15
Panel B showed that few funds reported alphas statistically larger than zero
at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. Only 14–22.5 percent of equity fund
managers exhibited superior stock selection skills. The results for balanced
funds were more extreme, ranging from 0 to 100 percent (the latter ﬁgure
must be interpreted with care as there is only one balanced fund with a ten-
year historical series ending 2001). The empirical results imply that unit
trusts managers in Singapore generally did not exhibit superior stock selec-
tion skills, so CPFmembers at the time could not expect them to outperform
the stock market.
Fund managers who do have market timing skill will report positive
gamma.16 Panel B showed that the average gamma of equity and balanced
table 15.10 Performance statistics of Singapore CPFIS-included unit trusts
A: Summary Statistics of CPFIS Unit Trusts
10-year period ending
Dec. 2001
10-year period ending
Dec. 2007
Average annual return (%) 7.96 10.27
CPF OA (average) annual rate (%) 3.23 2.77
T-notes/bond yield annual rate (%) 3.73 3.02
B: Alphas and Gammas of CPFIS Unit Trusts
Period ending Dec. 2001 Period ending Dec. 2007
Equity Balanced Equity Balanced
Average Alpha (%) 0.35 0.62 0.32 0.07
% where Alpha > 0 14 100a 22.5 0
Average Gamma (%) 0 0 0 0
% where Gamma > 0 29 0 27.50 50
Note : [a] There is only one balanced fund in the sample.
Source : Koh et al. (2008b), tables 2 and 4.
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funds was zero, and only 27.5–50 percent of funds reported gammas larger
than zero at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. This implies that fund man-
agers generally did not exhibit market timing skills and they cannot be
relied upon to earn superior returns.
High fees and charges for CPFIS options
The range of fees charged by CPFIS unit trusts can be bewildering to naïve
investors, as it includes sales charges, transaction fees, realization charges,
switching fees, annual operations fees, performance fees, and redemption
charges. The sales charge (front-end load) for unit trusts can be hefty, as
high as 5 percent of the amount invested. Some unit trusts do not impose a
sales charge but instead levy a realization charge (back-end load) upon
divestment by investors. When selling out of a fund within 90 days of
purchasing it, an investor may also have to pay a redemption fee. An
additional switching fee is imposed when investors switch between funds.
In addition to these charges, unit trusts also pay a wide range of fees such
as management, trustee, administration, custodian, registrar, audit, account-
ing, and valuation.17 Although these fees are borne by unit trusts directly,
they are eventually passed on to investors through lower dividends. To help
investors gauge the cost associated with investment in unit trusts, fund
managers are asked to declare their total expense ratio which captures all
their operating cost as a proportion of the fund’s average Net Asset Value
(NAV).18 Table 15.11 shows that the sales load of CPFIS-included unit trusts
ranged from 0.1 to 5 percent of NAV, expense ratios from 0.7 to 2.1 percent,
and annual management fees from 0.5 to 1.4 percent. As observed by
Mitchell (1998), the fees levied in Singapore appear to be far more diverse
and complex than those of the US institutional market.
To evaluate how investment cost can impact the return of retirement
savings of a CPF member who had invested in unit trusts, Koh et al. (2008a)
computed the rate of return an investor would require in order to ‘cost-
recover’ the expenses over one-year (short-term), ﬁve-year (medium-term),
and ten- to twenty-year (long-term) periods. In the simulation, they assumed
that the prices of unit trusts remain unchanged so the change in fund value
reﬂects solely the cost levied by the unit trust. They also assumed that
management fees and other annual operating costs were ﬁxed at the prevail-
ing average rates for equity, balanced, income, and money market funds.19
Table 15.12 shows how much $1 investment would be eroded by annual
operating costs, assuming no change in the value of component securities in
the unit trust. It computes the annual rate of return required for an investor
to ‘cost-recover’ by each fund type. The values are large for short horizons.
For example, transaction costs of an equity fund eroded 6.9 percent of its
value in one year and 3 percent per annum over a ﬁve-year holding period.
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table 15.12 Simulation study showing the percentage of $1 investment eroded by
expenses assuming zero investment return, by fund type and holding period (%)
Type of Fund 1 year 5 years 10 years 20 years
Equity 6.90 3.00 2.60 2.30
Balanced 6.60 2.90 2.40 2.20
Income 3.20 1.50 1.30 1.20
Money market 0.80 0.70 0.70 0.70
Notes: This simulation study assumes that the prices of unit trusts in Singapore remain unchanged
so the change in the fund position solely reﬂects cost impacts on a $1 investment over 1, 5, 10,
and 20 years. Costs include the one-off sales load and the annual operating costs for each of the
four fund types as presented in Table 15.10. The sales load comprises both front-end and back-
end sales charges. Annual operating costs comprise fees for management, custodian, trustee,
administration, and other major fees paid by the unit trust out of the fund’s net asset value, and
are estimated using the total expense ratio publicly reported by Investment Management
Association of Singapore (IMAS) under its Fund Information Service website (www.fu
ndsingapore.com). The performance fee is excluded from the total expense ratio.
Source : Koh et al. (2008b), table 11.
table 15.11 Summary data on costs associated with unit trust investment in
Singapore
Number of
funds sampled
Average sales
loads (%)
Average
management
fee (%)
Average expense
ratio (%)
Equity funds 167 4.9 1.4 2.1
Active 164 5 1.4 2.1
Passive 3 2.1 0.7 1
Balanced funds 26 4.8 1.3 1.9
Active 22 5 1.3 2.1
Passive 4 3.5 1 1.3
Income funds 39 2.1 0.9 1.1
Cash funds 3 0.1 0.5 0.7
Sample mean 4.4 1.3 1.9
Notes :
a) The sales load comprises both front-end and back-end sales charges. Annual operating costs
comprise fees for management, custodian, trustee, administration, and other major fees
paid by the unit trust out of the fund’s net asset value, and are estimated using the total
expense ratio publicly reported by Investment Management Association of Singapore
(IMAS) under its Fund Information Service website (<http://www.fundsingapore.com>).
b) There is one partially passive fund under the income funds category. However, its costs are
not presented separately since one single fund is not a representative sample for analysis.
Source : Koh et al. (2008b), table 4.
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The high transaction costs associated with unit trusts may explain low
participation rates of CPF members in CPF Investment Scheme.
Given the numerous instruments available for investments, we would have
expected CPF members to exploit them to grow their savings over the long
term. Yet Table 15.13 paints a rather disappointing picture of their invest-
ment performance: almost half of CPFIS-OA investors (47 percent)
incurred losses from investing, while 35 percent realized proﬁts equal to
or less than the default OA rate of 2.5 percent. Only 18 percent of the
investors made net realized proﬁts in excess of the OA interest rate. Allow-
ing a free rein for CPF members to invest their savings may not help those
lacking investment skills. Rather, what they need might be professional
advice and default portfolios such as indexed portfolios or life cycle funds,
which are attractive in the US to those lacking ﬁnancial knowledge.
Reforming Singapore’s Social Security
Savings System
Our review of Singapore’s Social Security Savings system in the preceding
sections showed that it is generally successful in helping CPF members own
their homes, pay for health care costs, and provide ﬁnancial protection for
their families. However, there are three areas that require reforms, namely,
retirement adequacy, asset enhancement, and health care ﬁnancing. The
relatively low cash savings accumulated in the CPF OA and SA accounts
point to low retirement adequacy faced by CPF members. In the following
sections, we provide speciﬁc suggestions on the reforms that could be
undertaken to improve retirement security.
Monetization of home equity
Although many Singaporeans are proud owners of their homes, they tend to
lack sufﬁcient retirement savings in the CPF accounts. This is termed the
‘asset rich and cash poor’ syndrome by McCarthy et al. (2002). As explained
previously, this situation arose because of excessive pre-retirement withdraw-
als of CPF savings to acquire homes. Figure 15.6 shows that 59 percent of
accumulated CPF OA savings have been channeled into property purchases.
With an inelastic supply of land for housing and a rising population, home
prices have been appreciating over the past few decades.20 Furthermore,
unlike the 1970s and 1980s where property was regarded as a home, many
people today regard properties as a ﬁnancial asset for wealth accumulation.
Due to the high cost of housing and the long duration of mortgage ser-
vicing, Singaporeans found themselves diverting the bulk of their lifetime
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Panel A. Portion of balance remaining in OA Account vs portion used for investment
Panel B. Portion of balance remaining in SA Account vs portion used for investment
OA 
Balance
29.45%
CPFIS-OA
11.52%
Property 
withdrawal
59.03%
SA
Balance
80.07%
CPFIS-
SA
19.93%
Figure 15.6 Portion invested and balance remaining in Singapore’s CPF Ordinary
(OA) and Special (SA) Accounts
Source : Koh et al. (2008a).
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incomes to home ownership instead of preparing for retirement. This has
resulted in a lack of liquidity during old age, and it suggests an urgent need
to introduce mechanisms for households to unlock home equity to generate
cash ﬂow for retirement. Currently, the four ways of monetizing home
equity in Singapore are reverse mortgage, subletting of home, downsizing
to a smaller home, and lease and buyback (Chia and Tsui 2009). We review
these mechanisms in the following sections and suggest further reﬁnements
that would make them more robust and effective.
Reverse mortgage
A reverse mortgage is a scheme whereby a home owner receives a stream of
income from a ﬁnancial institution for a speciﬁed period in return for
progressively giving up equity ownership of his home. Upon the owner’s
death, the home is sold by the ﬁnancial institution to recover the loan and
cumulative interest due. The key appeal of a reverse mortgage is that the
owner gets to stay in his own home while receiving a regular income for daily
expenditures. A disadvantage is that the owner may lose ownership of his
home should its market value fall abruptly below the allowable limit; this is
more likely to happen during a property market crash. In recent years,
commercial lenders have been encouraged to offer reverse mortgage
schemes to help members unlock their home equity, though their response
has been lukewarm, with very few transactions done. With the bulk of
housing stock in public housing apartments, ﬁnancial institutions ﬁnd it
difﬁcult to offer reverse mortgages on homes with short leases.21 The asset
values are likely to depreciate as the leases approach their expiration dates.
Given the proﬁt motive and risk aversion of ﬁnancial institutions, it is
unlikely that the private reverse mortgage market will thrive in Singapore in
the future. If the reverse mortgage market for public housing units is to take
off, HDB, the public housing board, must step in as the market maker to
offer these contracts. To make the scheme attractive to owners, the lending
rate should be the current HDB’s loan rate which is currently pegged at 2.6
percent (0.1 percent above the OA rate). This is reasonable since that HDB
is currently offering new housing loans to ﬁrst-time home buyers at this rate.
The risk to HDB is that the value of ﬂats may drop to a level that is
insufﬁcient to recover the loan. This tail risk can be hedged by buying
insurance against that outcome.
Subletting
Owners of public housing ﬂats may sublet part of their homes to earn rental
income. This option is appealing to older owners, as they get to stay in their
homes which they can then bequeath to their children. An impediment to
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widespread subletting in Singapore is the concern about personal safety and
privacy. Aged owners worry about their personal safety when subletting a
part of their homes to strangers. A strong preference for privacy also means
that owners are unlikely to accept intrusion into their family’s daily routines.
A recent survey carried out by the government found that 54 percent of
home owners would not sublet due to concerns about privacy and 20
percent due to security concerns. The long-term solution to these two
problems is to design dual-key apartments with two separate entrances.
When the owner has decided to sublet his home, he can erect a wall to
divide the apartment, thereby creating two smaller living units with separate
entrances. This allows the owner to live in a separate area of the apartment
from his tenant. Existing public housing apartment without the dual-key
entrances can be renovated to have this feature.
Downsizing
Public housing units of different sizes ranging from two- to four-bedroom
apartments are currently sold to citizens, and owners of larger apartments
can downsize to smaller apartments to extract home equity. To encourage
downsizing, the government has provided a S$20,000 cash incentive to
owners. The extracted home equity can then be invested in a life annuity
to provide a lifetime income. Yet some elderly members may ﬁnd it
difﬁcult to adjust to new living environments after downsizing, as their
new homes may be in different neighborhoods from their former homes
and they may lose their social network of friends and relatives when
moving to new localities. The public housing board may wish to consider
building mixed housing types in the same neighborhood to allow owners
to downsize to new apartments located within a couple of blocks of their
old homes.
Lease and buyback
In a lease and buyback scheme, the homeowner sells away the lease period
remaining beyond 30 years to the public housing authority to generate a
lump-sum payment. This scheme is currently applicable to owners age 65 or
older. The advantage of this scheme is that the owner gets to live in his ﬂat
for another 30 years, in addition to getting a cash payout. The key risk of the
scheme is that the owner may need to vacate his home if he outlives the
thirty-year lease period. Due to this uncertainty, few people have taken up
this scheme, as the elderly dislike taking longevity risk during old age. To
make the scheme more attractive, the public housing board might assume
the tail risk of an owner outliving the thirty-year lease period. Given current
mortality tables, it is relatively easy to estimate the likelihood of this
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occurring and the number of owners involved. If need be, this risk could be
hedged through insurance.
Limiting withdrawal of CPF for housing
Excessive pre-retirement withdrawals to acquire housing is a contributing
factor leading to a lack of liquidity in retirement. Although most house-
holds will have a fully paid home at retirement, they may have insufﬁ-
cient cash ﬂows for daily living. And while owners can monetize their
homes, the amount of home equity they can extract is subject to market
risk. For example, Singapore’s property market plunged 45 percent from
1996 to 1998, and 25 percent during the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis. In a
depressed real estate market, retirees may be forced to sell out at ﬁre-sale
prices. An asset-based retirement strategy is therefore clearly risky. One
long-term solution to the ‘asset rich, cash poor’ syndrome is to restrain
the amount of pension savings that can be diverted into property pur-
chases, so that CPF participants can earmark sufﬁcient savings for retire-
ment. When the housing schemes were ﬁrst launched, CPF members
could withdraw up to 160 percent of home valuation, 150 percent in
2002, and 120 percent in 2007. The CPF Board may wish to consider
reducing the maximum withdrawal amount to not exceed 100 percent of
home valuation.
Raising contribution rates of older age groups
Table 15.3 showed that the contribution rates decline rapidly by age from 36
percent for workers below age 50, to 11.5 percent for those above age 65.
The rationale for reducing contribution rates for older workers is to
enhance their employability. Besides lowering employer’s contributions,
employees’ contribution rates also fall with age. Yet low contribution rates
for aged workers can adversely affect their ability to achieve old age retire-
ment adequacy. To boost adequacy, contribution rates for the older age
groups could be raised progressively until they are at parity with the younger
workers.
Hedging against inﬂation risk
The life annuity offered by the CPF Board has been estimated to be quite
valuable (Fong et al. 2011). This is primarily due to low administrative
charges and little adverse selection. In addition, due to the non-proﬁt status
of the CPF Board in managing the annuity scheme, proﬁts typically earned
by private insurers who offer similar life annuities are returned to members
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by the CPF. While the mandatory life annuity is useful in hedging longevity
risk, its current features have some deﬁciencies that may beneﬁt from
reﬁnement. First, the payouts are not predetermined at the point of
purchase at age 55; the CPF Board instead only provides an indicative
estimate of future payouts which are not guaranteed. The payouts are
determined by prevailing interest rates as well as population mortality
changes, so there is some uncertainty as to whether the annuity payouts
will be sufﬁcient to provide a subsistence level of living. Furthermore, the
scheme is not hedged against inﬂation, which means that the payouts will
have decreasing purchasing power as retirees age. Moving forward, the
annuity scheme could be enhanced to provide an inﬂation-indexed
payout. Nevertheless, this could substantially reduce early beneﬁt payout
levels.
CPF contribution rates used as a macro-economic
counter-cyclical tool
Although the primary goal of CPF is to prepare members for retirement, it
has been used occasionally as a cost-cutting tool to combat recession. For
instance, in 1986, the Singapore government took the unprecedented
action of slashing employers’ contributions from 25 to 10 percent. The
second time a similarly drastic reduction in employer’s contribution rate
occurred was during the 1999 Asian Financial Crisis, when the contribution
rate was reduced from 20 to 10 percent. These cuts effectively reduced the
retirement savings of individuals by 15 and 10 percent respectively. The
purpose of these cuts was to reduce business costs for employers and
increase their cost competitiveness so that they could recover quickly from
the recession or crisis. Yet these cuts signiﬁcantly reduced workers’ retire-
ment savings, as when their SA contribution rate fell to 0 percent in 1986
and 1999. This rate reduction was only partially restored in 1994. Similarly,
the 10 percent reduction in employers’ contribution rate was partially
restored by 2 percent in 2000, another 4 percent in 2001 bringing the rate
to its current level of 16 percent (previously 20 percent). In sum, the
contribution rate for employers has declined by 9 percentage points from
its peak of 25 percent in 1986.
The key policy issue to address is whether a country’s pension system
should be used as a counter-cyclical cost-cutting tool to help ﬁrms recover
during economic recession. While it may help corporations cut costs, years
in which contribution rates are low will adversely affect members’ retire-
ment adequacy. Ideally, the government should utilize other monetary,
ﬁscal, or administrative measures outside the retirement system to resusci-
tate an ailing economy.
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Extending the retirement age
Another measure to boost retirement adequacy would be to extend work-
ers’ ofﬁcial retirement age. Currently, the statutory minimum retirement
age in Singapore is 62, though under the recently introduced Retirement
and Reemployment Act, employers are required to offer re-employment to
eligible employees age 62–5 and the government is mulling over extend-
ing this further to age 67. For workers who are healthy and able, they
should be allowed to continue working. Employers are strongly encour-
aged by the government to engage older workers as long as they are
healthy and able to perform in their jobs. By working longer, workers
keep themselves mentally alert and have a means to support themselves
ﬁnancially during old age.
Healthcare Financing
The current MediShield Scheme provides insurance cover for members to
pay large inpatient bills, yet our review of the scheme revealed several
limitations. For example, the scheme does not cover pre-existing medical
conditions and members older than 92 years of age. This means that the
elderly above 92 are completely exposed to huge health care bills without
insurance. With life expectancy rising, more health insurance protection
will be needed. This could be achieved if the MediShield Scheme were
enhanced to allow for universal and lifetime coverage. With these reﬁne-
ments, members would be covered throughout their lives, no matter how
old they are; pre-existing illnesses could be covered as well. With better
beneﬁts, health care costs will rise, but this may be diversiﬁed by pooling
those with pre-existing medical conditions with those that are healthy. The
Singapore government is currently considering whether such a modiﬁed
scheme (MediShield Life) would be feasible and affordable if introduced.
Other reﬁnements being considered include raising the maximum claim-
able limit above the current level of S$300,000, increasing the daily claim
limit by 55 percent, or lowering the co-insurance payment by policy partici-
pants. With these changes, it is anticipated that the majority of Singaporeans
could pay less than S$3,000 out of pocket cost for large inpatient bills, as the
bulk would be paid by insurance. While a universal, lifetime medical insur-
ance scheme ensures that health care is affordable and accessible, the
premium paid can escalate rapidly if there is rampant over-utilization of
health care services. Measures should be put in place to discourage unneces-
sary consumption of health care services and to contain the rising health
care cost. This will ensure that the MediShield Life insurance scheme will be
sustainable over the long run.
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Asset Enhancement
Lowering transaction costs of CPFIS scheme
As noted, professionally managed funds in Singapore charge high sales
loads of 4.4 percent, management fees of 1.3 percent, and expense ratios
of 1.9 percent (Table 15.11). To lower transaction costs, the CPF Board
announced a few policy changes in 2007 and 2008 to make it more afford-
able for members to invest in CPFIS-included funds. These include the
capping of front-load charges of all CPF-included funds at 3 percent (as of
July 1, 2007) and expense ratios at the median of existing funds from the
same risk category (from January 1, 2008).22 The revised 3 percent front-end
load is signiﬁcantly lower than the 5 percent front-end load previously
charged by professionally managed funds. The expense ratio of equity
funds will now be capped at 1.95 percent of the fund’s NAV, balanced
funds at 1.75 percent, ﬁxed income funds at 1.15 percent, and money
market funds at 0.65 percent.23 A review of the US market found that the
average expense ratio for equity funds was 1.13 percent and that of bond
funds was 0.9 percent (ICI 2006). Compared to the US then, transaction
costs of investing in CPFIS funds are still high. For a start, the CPF Board
might want to omit small funds with inefﬁcient cost structure from the CPF
Investment Scheme, replacing them with larger global funds with low trans-
action costs.
With the myriad of fees charged by funds, investors need to comb through
prospectuses carefully to estimate all the component costs. Yet, it is onerous
for a naïve investor to sieve through each of the 400 CPFIS-included unit
trust prospectuses to decipher their cost structure and compute overall costs
before deciding whether to invest in them. To help CPF members make
investment decisions painlessly, the CPF Board can consider developing a
real-time, online calculator to combine all the myriad charges and fees in a
single overall cost measure. This statistic would allow the investor to know
the true cost of investment and thereafter decide if the unit trust is worth
investing in after adjusting for all associated costs.
Offering low-cost passive default portfolios
There are more than 400 funds on offer in Singapore at present, and some
CPF members are overwhelmed by the number of funds they need to
evaluate. Although new funds are admitted into CPFIS after clearing a set
of stringent admission criteria, there are fewer rigors in screening out
existing poor performers from the scheme. It would be useful to streamline
the investment menu regularly, so that only high-performing funds remain
in the scheme on offer to CPF members (Koh and Mitchell 2010).
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In studying the asset allocation decisions of CPF investors, Koh et al.
(2008a) found that men were more proactive in investing their savings
compared to women. They tended to invest more in shares and unit trusts
than women, who chose to put the bulk of savings in insurance products.
This ﬁnding is similar to the US, where higher income men sought riskier
investments and traded more in their accounts (Mitchell et al. 2006a).
Contrary to conventional wisdom that investment in risky products should
decrease with age, the more mature CPF members (56+ age groups)
invested a higher proportion of their savings in individual stocks and less
in insurance products, as compared to those in the younger age groups. In
addition, the younger working adults were more likely to delegate their
investments to professional fund managers while the mature group tended
to invest in shares on their own. These investment behaviors conﬁrmed
ﬁndings by Mitchell et al. (2006a) for the US, that higher income, older men
were more likely to hold riskier portfolios compared to their female and
younger counterparts. Koh et al. (2008a) also found that lower income
earners were less likely to hold risky investments, with at least 70 percent
of their investments committed to insurance products. As salary levels rose,
so did the fraction invested in risky instruments.
These research ﬁndings have identiﬁed three vulnerable groups of
investors needing special attention: women, the aged, and the low-income.
Women and low-income members may need more guidance to select the
right ﬁnancial products to grow their retirement savings. For the older
members, they need advice on portfolio rebalancing so that, as they age,
they reduce exposure to risky ﬁnancial instruments to preserve their
savings.
Of the numerous funds on offer in the CPF Investment Scheme, very few
are low-cost, passively managed, index-linked funds or ETFs, and there are
no target maturity date life cycle funds and inﬂation-protected instru-
ments.24 Life cycle funds may appeal to ﬁnancially less-savvy members as
these funds automatically rebalance the portfolio based on investor age.
One possible reason for the low investment in unit trusts is that CPF
members do not know how to evaluate and select funds for investments.
Without guidance from the CPF Board, these members simply default their
savings in the OA or SA accounts. If they could access default portfolios,
which have low transaction costs and are well-diversiﬁed, CPF members
would stand a better chance of growing their savings substantially over the
long term. Of the 400 funds, few can exploit economies of scale, and their
higher cost of operations will be passed on to retail investors. One reform
that the CPF Board could consider would be to invite a few large low-cost
privately managed life cycle funds to participate in the CPF Investment
Scheme. The CPF Board could then pool all members together to enjoy
lower institutional transaction costs.
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As an example, Chile is a country that has adopted life cycle funds as the
default portfolios in its pension system. Private pension managers there
offer up to ﬁve funds, ranging from ‘Fund A,’ which invests 80 percent of
the portfolio in equities, to ‘Fund E’, which invests 100 percent in ﬁxed
income securities. Funds B to D hold intermediate weightage in equities.
Chileans may select up to two funds at a time offered by a single money
manager; the fund manager then automatically rebalances participants’
portfolios to a more conservative one as members age (Arenas de Mesa
et al. 2008). The introduction of diversiﬁed low-cost life cycle funds could
appeal to many less sophisticated members and help increase participation
in Singapore’s CPF Investment Scheme as well.
Lessons for the United States
The pension system adopted by the United States is a multi-pillar retirement
system entailing a universal social security, an employment-based pension,
and voluntary savings. Increasingly, the US Social Security System faces a
mounting sustainability problem of ﬁnancing Baby Boomers’ retirement in
the future. This is due to the dwindling population of young taxpayers and
longer life expectancy of post-war retirees. The pay-as-you-go pension system
is expected to experience signiﬁcant stress from the impending ﬁscal imbal-
ance. Compounding this problem is the low US households’ savings rate,
which portends inadequate private savings for old age. The private pension
system is predominantly employment-based and offers either a traditional
deﬁned beneﬁt plan (DB) or an increasingly popular deﬁned contribution
(DC) plan. For DB pension plans, employers assume the responsibility of
providing pensions to employees during their retirement. For DC pension
plans, employers make regular contributions to employees’ retirement
accounts but are not responsible for providing income to retired employees.
Instead, the burden of retirement adequacy is transferred to employees.
Increasing pension coverage
One of the criteria of a successful pension system is the extent of pension
coverage for employees. Ideally, a good pension system should cover all
employees. As US employer-sponsored 401(k) pension plans are offered to
employees on a voluntary basis, this has resulted in relatively low participa-
tion rates by companies. Additionally, the decision on who is covered and
how much employers should contribute in 401(k) plans vary across com-
panies. For companies that offer such plans, many employees do not con-
tribute the maximum or take full advantage of matching contributions by
employers. Consequently, the median balance of these plans stands at a
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relatively low US$77,000.25 It is estimated that currently only one out of two
workers in the US has a pension (Forman 2006; Moore 2011). In contrast,
the Singapore’s CPF system is able to achieve full coverage for all working
adults by making participation mandatory. Under the current US political
environment, it is not feasible to enact laws to compel employers to offer
pension plans and employees to enroll in these plans. A more viable alter-
native is for the US government to require all employers to offer either a 401
(k) plan or an IRA. In addition, by setting the default to automatic enroll-
ment for both 401(k) and IRA, the participation level from employees can
be raised and the level of savings can be increased (OECD 2012; Thaler and
Benartzi 2007).
Expanding the scope of 401(k) plans
Unlike the US pension systems which focused solely on ﬁnancing retire-
ment, Singapore’s comprehensive CPF system helps members to own homes
and ﬁnance health care in addition to preparing them for retirement. The
success and sustainability of Singapore’s social security savings system over
the last 59 years suggests that such a comprehensive pension system can be
viable for the US and other countries. Some plan participants may prefer to
use pension savings to ﬁnance housing or repay education loans in the early
years of their working life. The US pension system currently does not
support these uses as pension savings can only be withdrawn for retirement
purpose.26 Using pension savings to acquire a home has several advantages
such as saving on rental payments during retirement, having the option to
monetize a valuable housing asset when liquidity is required, and avoiding
the need to pay high interest on mortgage loans. Singapore’s CPF System
currently allows members to make pre-retirement withdrawals to purchase
homes, service mortgage payments, and ﬁnance tertiary education. The
interest rate charged on housing loans is the default interest paid on the
CPF account plus 0.1 percent. With this home ﬁnancing scheme, most CPF
members are able to fully own their own homes prior to retirement. For
education loans, the interest levied is the default CPF interest rate of 2.5
percent. At such low interest cost, children can comfortably repay education
loans that were ﬁnanced by parents’ CPF savings. In contrast, the educa-
tional loans taken by US college entrants are pegged to commercial loans’
rates, thereby making loans costly and repayment burdensome. A key worry
about making the pension system more ﬂexible is the adverse effect on
retirement adequacy. If pre-retirement withdrawals are generous and lax,
pension plan participants may end up with insufﬁcient retirement savings.
Singapore’s CPF system mitigates this risk by requiring recipients of edu-
cation loans to repay the loan principal with interest into their parent’s
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CPF account upon graduation. By enlarging the scope to accommodate
housing and education ﬁnancing, 401(k) plans can be made more attract-
ive for members and their participation in such plans can be expected
to rise.
Enhancing the portability of pension account
Currently, all 401(k) plans are sponsored and administered by employers,
and this rigid linkage between a worker and his employer can limit labor
mobility. US employees stand to lose their pension beneﬁts if they change
their employers prior to the vesting period. Portability can be greatly
enhanced if the US follows Singapore’s system of requiring all employees
to set up employees’ pension accounts with an independent pension admin-
istrator (CPF Board).27 Using a central body in pension management allows
workers to retain the same pension accounts even when they change
employers. With a centralized system, employers’ role is dramatically simpli-
ﬁed to being a conduit of employees’ pension contributions. Portability of
pension accounts can be further enhanced if the contributions made by
employers and employees are standardized across all companies.
Hedging longevity risk through annuitization
401(k) plans are currently not required to offer annuities and few do.
Furthermore, for plans that offer life annuities, the take-up rate is low.28
Upon retirement, most plan participants withdraw their pension savings as a
lump sum, thereby exposing them to longevity risk if they outlive their
savings. By contrast, Singapore mandates annuitization of retirement sav-
ings, requiring that the Minimum Sum of $148,000 be invested in a life
annuity. The income from life annuities provides approximately S$1,200
per month for a retiree to maintain a subsistence level of living. As income
will be paid throughout an annuitant’s life, longevity risk faced by retirees
is hedged. With a partial annuitization of the Minimum Sum, the CPF
member can still withdraw his remaining savings in lump sum. The unique
features of Singapore’s life annuity scheme are that it is mandatory and the
government is its underwriter. This results in signiﬁcant beneﬁts to annu-
itants such as economies of scale, pooling of longevity risk, low adverse
selection cost, and affordable premiums. While it is unlikely that the
United States can mandate annuitization of pension assets, it can increase
purchase of annuities by requiring all employers to offer life annuities in
401(k) plans and making them the default option on drawdown at retire-
ment. This will help plan participants overcome their inertia in dealing
with longevity risk.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 11/12/2015, SPi
Singapore’s Social Security Savings System 333
Enhancing risk diversiﬁcation through pension design
In 401(k) plans, the onus is on plan participants to grow their pension assets
through judicious investments. Given the low level of ﬁnancial literacy
worldwide, it would be challenging for plan participants to make informed
investment decisions. Some may be overly conservative in investing while
others may be overly aggressive by taking excessive risk. Singapore’s CPF
Investment Scheme has been carefully designed to encourage risk diversiﬁ-
cation. For example, while members can assume more investment risk when
investing their OA saving, they cannot do this with their SA savings. With OA
savings, members can avail themselves of the complete menu of investment
instruments. However, the range of investment instruments is drastically
reduced when investing SA savings that are meant for retirement. In add-
ition, when investing OA savings, there is a 10 percent cap on investments in
gold and a 35 percent cap on investments in individual common shares,
REITs, and corporate bonds. With such built-in limits on investments in
speciﬁc asset classes, members are more likely to end up with a broadly
diversiﬁed portfolio. Like the CPF Investment Scheme, the US 401(k) plans
can enhance risk diversiﬁcation by placing caps on howmuch pension assets
can be invested in each asset class.
Intergenerational transfers to enhance retirement
adequacy
Singapore’s CPF Board provides substantial ﬂexibility for inter-generational
transfers to enhance retirement adequacy in households. For example, a
member can top up the CPF accounts of his grandparents, parents, spouse,
and siblings. Such transfers are tax exempt and can enhance the retirement
adequacy of household members who currently do not have sufﬁcient
pension savings. 401(k) plans currently do not accept contributions from
anyone other than the employee or his employer. To enhance retirement
adequacy, the rules on contributions into the 401(k) plan can be relaxed to
allow for external cash injection into a worker’s account. Government tax
incentives can also be used to promote top-ups made to an employee’s
account whose balance is below a threshold level.
Conclusion
Since 1955, Singapore’s social security savings system has helped citizens
save for retirement. This chapter has explored its various schemes intro-
duced through the years to help citizens own homes, gain health care
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coverage, attain ﬁnancial protection for families, save for retirement, and
grow pension assets. The CPF Board has been successful in achieving its ﬁrst
three objectives, of home ownership, health care coverage, and ﬁnancial
protection. More remains to be done for retirement adequacy and asset
enhancement, since many CPF members have insufﬁcient cash savings for
retirement. Due to high transaction costs, lack of ﬁnancial literacy, and
inertia, many have not taken advantage of the large menu of investment
instruments on offer to grow their retirement savings. Instead, they left them
in their CPF OA and SA accounts earning low interest. Singapore’s system
could enhance the retirement security of its members by developing ﬁnan-
cial markets to facilitate monetizing home equity, limiting the withdrawal of
retirement savings for home purchase, raising contributions of older work-
ers, reﬁning the CPF life scheme to offer inﬂation-indexed payouts, avoiding
using CPF contribution rates as counter-cyclical tools, and extending the
retirement age of workers. While the MediShield Scheme has been effective
in helping members pay off large hospital bills, it can also be enhanced to
provide universal and lifetime coverage for members. Retirement will be
more secure if CPF members can grow their savings through investments in
high-yield portfolios. To this end, the CPF investment scheme can be
enhanced by systematically reducing the transaction costs of funds on
offer. Offering low-cost passive default portfolios such as index-funds,
ETFs, and life cycle funds will make investment a hassle-free experience
for the ﬁnancially illiterate. The CPF savings system has several attractive
features that can be modiﬁed and adapted in the US to increase participa-
tion rate in 401(k) plans. Speciﬁcally, 401(k) plans can be expanded to
permit ﬁnancing for housing and college education, maximize portability by
centralizing pension administration, reduce longevity risk through annuiti-
zation, promote risk diversiﬁcation through the setting of investment limits,
and encourage intergenerational transfers to boost the retirement adequacy
of households.
Endnotes
1. The Singapore fertility rate in 2011 was reported as 1.2 by the World Bank.
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.INwww.census.gov>. Sin-
gapore’s Dept of Statistics reported the life expectancy of males and females to
be 79.9 years and 84.5 years, respectively. See <www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/
visualising_data/chart/Life_Expectancy_At_Birth.html>.
2. Active CPF members are individuals with at least one contribution in the current
or preceding three months.
3. The income ceiling for CPF contributions has varied over the years from a low of
S$500 in 1955 to a high of S$6,000 during the 1985 to 2003 period. Since Sept. 2001,
it has stabilized at S$5,000. The exchange rate as of June 2014 was S$1.25 = US$1.
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4. The income ceiling relevant for CPF contributions is set to not exceed the 80th
percentile income level.
5. See <http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/Int-Rates/Int-Rates.htm>.
6. See McCarthy et al. (2002) and Low and Aw (1997) for further discussion of the
housing loan arrangements.
7. For details see <http://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/Gen-Info/FAQ/investment/
CPF-Invscheme.htm>.
8. Dependents are immediate family members such as spouse, children, parents, or
grandparents.
9. The only exceptions were 1980, 1981, 1994, 2008, 2011, and 2012.
10. The World Bank recommends that countries should aim for an IRR of 53
percent of net ﬁnal year wage or 78 percent of net average lifetime wage.
11. The monthly payout and bequest are estimated for a retiree who reached age 55
in 2014 with a minimum sum of S$148,000.
12. When introduced in 1986, the CPF Investment Scheme was known as the
Approved Investment Scheme. It was subsequently renamed in 1994 to offer a
wider range of ﬁnancial instruments for investments by CPF members.
13. Unit trusts are similar to mutual funds except that they are created under a trust
deed with an external trustee monitoring the portfolio manager on behalf of
unit investors.
14. These returns do not include transaction costs.
15. A positive Jensen Alpha Æj from the regression Rjt  Rft = Æj + j (Rmt  Rft) + j
indicates that the manager was able to select stocks to earn superior returns.
16. A positive gamma ªj from the quadratic regression Rjt  Rft = Æj + j (Rmt  Rft) +
ªj(Rmt  Rft)2 + j indicates that the manager was able to time the market to earn
superior returns.
17. Other fees include service fee, asset allocation fee, legal fee, printing fee, and
distribution fee.
18. The NAV of a unit trust is the value of the unit trust fund’s assets less its liabilities.
19. Different unit trusts may have different investment objectives, different styles of
management, and different levels of equity risk depending on their portfolio
allocation. This is recognized by Mercer Investment Consulting, CPF Board’s
consultant, which has developed a risk classiﬁcation system for the CPFIS that
assigns various risk levels to permitted investments. The unit trust or ILP with a
greater proportion of its assets invested in the more volatile stock market will
have a higher equity risk. Based on its level of equity risk, a unit trust or
Investment Linked Product is assigned one of the four risk categories.
20. Singapore is an island nation with a small land area of 716.1 km2. Although it
tries to increase the land area through reclamation of shoreline, the increase is a
marginal 1 km2 from 2012 to 2013. Singapore’s population grew rapidly from 3
million in 1990 to 5.3 million in 2012.
21. Public housing apartments are sold on 99-year leases. A 65-year-old member who
bought his home at the age of 30 will have a lease with remaining life of 64 years.
22. Announcement of Dec. 28, 2006; see <mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/CPF/News/News-
Release/N_28December2006.htm>.
23. <mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/CPF/News/News-Release/N_29Dec2005.htm>.
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24. It would also be of interest to offer inﬂation-indexed bonds, as these make good
sense for the retirement decumulation phase (Brown et al. 2000).
25. Fidelity reported that the average 401(k) balance as at end of 2012 is US$77,300.
26. Although employees can take loans from their retirement account, they are
substantially penalized. Currently, withdrawals prior to age 59.5 are subject to
10 percent tax on distributions.
27. Oakley and Kenneally (2013) reported in a recent survey that most Americans
prefer a pension system that provides portability from job to job.
28. Paul Yakoboki (2010) found that only 19 percent of retirees annuitized a portion
of their retirement savings and David L. Wray (2008) noted that about 20
percent of deﬁned contribution plans offer annuities but savings are hardly
ever annuitized.
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